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Abstract 
The state-owned energy enterprise, in essence, is a kind of contractual arrangement. In order to maximize national 
interests, the state delegates executives to operate business in the energy sector by combining energy resources with 
other resources through a series of contracts. Yet the features of state-owned energy enterprises, such as monopoly, 
negative externalities, strong asset specificity  and high opportunism risks, could give rise to some negative impacts. 
So, in order to avoid negative impacts, improve governance efficiency and achieve harmony between man and nature, 
we should improve government regulation system, establish a more efficient board, implement a reasonable operator 
incentive system, and revise the supervision and constraint mechanisms. 
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1. Introduction 
As the basic industry of national economy, the energy industry has played a very  important part in the 
social and economic development. So do Chinese state-owned energy enterprises (SOEEs). They assume 
heavy responsibilit ies for guaranteeing the energy safety and supporting the economic development. 
However, many accidents have taken place in recent years, such as the loss China Aviation Oil suffered, 
the cadmium pollution to Beijiang River and Xiangjiang River, the lead poisoning  involving children in 
Fengxiang and Wugang. Maybe people have to concern about the corporate governance of Chinese 
SOEEs. And for those reasons we write this paper which consists of 4 parts. The first part is to explore 
the nature of SOEEs. The second part is to analyse their features. The third part is to put forward some 
suggestions to their corporate governance. The last part is the concluding remarks. 
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2. The Nature of State-owned Energy Enterprises 
The nature of the firm can be broadly classified into two theories: transaction cost theory and contract 
theory. Transaction cost theory considers the firm as an alternative to the market (Coase, 1937). They 
believe that a firm is a particular type of social institution that can improve the efficiency of transactions 
(Spulber, 2009). While contract theory points out that the nature of the firm is  a contractual relationship to 
restrict the behaviour of traders (Alchian, 1984), as “nexus for a complex set of voluntary contracts 
among customers, workers, managers and suppliers” (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). Therefore, we could 
say that contract theory analyzes the firm from the perspective of relationship; transaction cost theory 
explains the firm from the standpoint of purpose that is to save transaction costs. And we believe that the 
firm is an economic unit (or organization) which operates business for its own interests by combining a 
lot of economic resources (including human and physical resources) through a series of contracts 
(including market contracts and non-market contracts). 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) are enterprises which are invested and controlled by the state. Their 
business scopes are characterized by strategy, usually covering energy resources, post and 
telecommunications, main  transportations, etc. SOEs come into being in various countries due to the 
comprehensive effect  of many factors, such as market failure, regulatory  defects, social object ives , etc. 
During the period of p lanned economy, SOEs are considered to be “community units”, which undertake a 
variety of functions, for example, production, social security, social welfare and social management  
(Liu,1995). Zhang and He (1996) further point out that the rigid boundary is unique for SOEs. However, 
after the economic reform, most social burdens of SOEs are removed. So  they can focus on the goal of 
making profit. Even so, SOEs still take on many responsibilit ies , because they can be used as tools and 
means to intervene in the economy, as policies and measures to deal with the issue of market failure in  the 
public interests (Huang and Yu, 2006). So we believe that the nature of SOEs is a kind of contractual 
arrangement. In order to maximize national interests , the state delegates executives to operate business by 
combining many resources (economic resources and political resources) through a series of contracts. 
SOEEs refer to SOEs in the energy sector such as coal, electricity, oil, natural gas and renewable 
energy. They have contributed to the realization of strategies for energy development (stable energy 
supply, energy security). The format ion of large SOEEs can strengthen competitive power in international 
energy market and reduce negative externalit ies in energy production process. The energy industry is 
characterized by natural monopoly, externality and public product  (Lin, 2009), which leads to 
indiscriminate mining, etc. If the energy enterprises are nationalized, environmental protection and energy 
saving could be carried out more effect ively. SOEEs are important part of SOEs; their nature is largely 
determined by that of SOEs. We believe that SOEEs  is a kind  of contractual arrangement too. In order to 
maximize national interests , the state will delegate executives to operate business in the energy sector by 
combining energy resources with other resources  through a series of contracts . 
3. Features of State-owned Energy Enterprises 
SOEEs develop in their own unique ways. So they have the following features: 
(1)Monopoly and conglomerate. Statistics show that the proportion of national capital in the energy 
industry is higher than 90%, even up to 99% in some industries, such as oil and gas industry, gas 
production and supply industry (as shown in figure 1). These features can be viewed from three aspects. 
(a) Oil and natural gas industry is characterized by oligopoly. For example the exploration, ext racting and 
market ing of o il and natural gas are exclusively controlled by the three large SOEEs (Sinopec, Petro 
China and CNOOC). (b ) Natural monopoly is typical of the power industry. Five independent power 
producers such as China Datang Group, monopolize the power production industry of China  while State 
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Grid Corporation of China and China Southern Power Grid Company control its supply. In 2008 the 
national capital of China's large power, heating production and supply enterprises was 184.828 b illion 
Yuan, much larger than other kinds of capital. (c) Conglomerate is the development trend of coal 
enterprises. The state capital in the large-scale coal enterprises in 2008 was 147.326 b illion Yuan, yet the 
total value of private capital, foreign capital, Hong Kong and Macao capital was less than 6.2 b illion 
Yuan. Besides, Chinese coal industry would be dominated by large state-owned coal enterprise groups 
(Shenhua Group, etc.) in the future. 
 
 
Data sources: China Industrial Statistical Yearbook in 2008. The number “1” in horizontal axis represents the coal mining industry; 
the number “2” represents the petroleum and natural gas exploitation industry; the number “3” represents the oil processing, nuclear 
fuel processing industry; the number “4” represents the electric power, heat power production and supply industry; the number “5” 
represents the gas production and supply industry. 
Figure 1: The Capital Structure of Chinese SOEEs 
(2) Strong asset specificity. Compared to other enterprises, SOEEs are featured by strong asset 
specificity. Asset specificity refers to the extent to which the investments made to support a particular 
transaction have a higher value to that transaction than they would have if they were redeployed for any 
other purpose (Williamson, 1999 i). And it is mainly  indicated in the fo llowing 5 aspects. (a) Site 
specificity. The d istribution of energy resources plays a decisive role in selecting min ing production sites 
of SOEEs, such as the selection of oil wells, mine. (b) Physical asset specificity. The energy industry 
needs to be furn ished with lots of sophisticated facilities such as power generator which  could only  be 
applied in this field. And such a fact leads to high barriers to entry for the energy industry. (c) Human 
asset specificity. SOEEs also need tremendous human capital, professionals for instance. (d) Special asset 
specificity. In order to improve the technical level, SOEEs demand enormous special investment which is 
exclusive for the energy industry. For example, China Guodian Corporation invested over 22 b illion Yuan 
in Da Gangshan Hydropower project in 2009 (2009 Guodian Corporation annual report , p. 81, 2010). (e) 
Brand asset specificity. More often than not, Petro China is a well-known brand just in the petroleum 
industry rather than in electricity, food or other fields. 
(3) Much negative externalit ies. Though negative externalit ies can partly be reduced, if energy 
enterprises were nationalized, but in  comparison to other industries, they are still troubled more 
intensively and frequently by negative externalities. If income or the cost of an economic activ ity judging 
from a social point of view are incons istent with income or the cost judging from the perspective of 
private or business, so called the economic activity has an externality . And if social cost of an economic 
activity exceeds the private cost, then the negative externality comes into being. Negative externalities of 
SOEEs mainly  refer to negative externalit ies of production, such as coal mining. They can be div ided into 
five categories: damage to workers, harm to the public, the ecological impact, the climate impact and 
landscape impact (Lin, 2009). In addition, on the one hand, part of negative externalit ies of SOEEs is  
public externalit ies, that are non-depletable externalities. The public externality has some characteristics 
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of public goods, such as non-competitive and non-exclusive. The cost to eliminate public negative 
externality is high. On the other hand, part of negative externalities of SOEEs also belongs  to 
intergenerational negative externalit ies, such as resource depletion, the greenhouse effect and so on. Their 
harm could have to be borne by future generations.  
(4)High opportunism risks. Compared to other enterprises, SOEEs more frequently give rise to higher 
risks of opportunism. Opportunism refers to the pursuit of self-interest by trick (Williamson, 1999ii). 
Opportunism risks confronting by SOEEs include the following 4 aspects. (a)The “free rider” behavior 
due to collective action. For example, minority shareholders can enjoy  with ease the benefits from the 
supervision by major shareholder over operators. (b)The “hold-up” because of asset specificity. The 
strong asset specificity of SOEEs will lead  to much transpose and exit costs, increas ing the risk of “hold-
up” by others. (c)The “adverse selection” on account of informat ion asymmetry. The most typical case is 
that when selecting directors and other senior staff investors are kept outside from the informat ion on the 
candidate and that when people cannot discover the aptitude and ability of potential agents , so that the 
one who although with poor quality, asks for a lower price will probably be selected. (d)The “moral 
hazard” based on informat ion asymmetry. It main ly falls into two types: firstly, after the signing of the 
contract SOEEs may raise product price and reduce output to erode consumer surplus by virtue of their 
monopoly position; secondly, the national interest are grabbed by SOEEs, taking advantage of 
informat ion asymmetry. The existence of dual or multip le principal-agent relationships in SOEEs often 
leads to higher moral hazard risks such as insider control and corporate tunneling effect too.  
4. The Governance of State-owned Energy Enterprises  
As mentioned above, in consequence of monopoly, strong asset specificity, negative externalit ies and 
opportunism risks, SOEEs may give rise to some negative outcomes. Monopoly would lead to high 
product price, underproduction, and resource waste so that consumers’ need couldn’t be satisfied and the 
whole social welfare  is under no circumstance to be improved. The increasing in “hold-up” risks would 
result from strong asset specificity. Negative externalit ies could beget market failure, over-exp loitation of 
resources, environmental pollution, and the erosion of consumer surplus by monopoly enterprises. And 
the harm to national interests may originates from the opportunistic behaviour. To avoid these negative 
consequences, we insist that special governance mechanism should be adopted to manage SOEEs. 
(1) Improving the government regulation system. The monopoly and negative externalities of SOEEs 
will lead to market failure, which requires a perfect government regulation system. The government 
should improve the government regulat ion system in both regulators and content. (a)Regulators are 
supposed to include government and industry associations. And the former is supposed to establish an 
independent regulatory agency so that government regulation and policy-making are no longer carried out 
just by one party and regulatory agency can make decision independently. It is also high time to remove 
the duties of policy-making and regulation from the SOEEs. To carry out self-regulation in the industry, 
the industry associations are expected to come into being. Automatic regulat ion by government agencies 
and self-regulation by industry associations is bound to improve regulatory effects (Wang, 2007). 
(b)Concerning content are the four following aspects : firstly, to intensify the competit ion among energy 
companies and to improve the efficiency of the energy industry the entering of new investors and new 
enterprises to the energy industry is a must; secondly, the government should improve environmental 
protection laws and regulations in the energy sector to reduce negative externalities which are caused 
during energy explorat ion, production and consumption; third ly, resources saving standards, 
technological innovation, resource-waste sanction are indispensable; and finally, the government should 
implement incentive price regulation, encourage enterprises to improve efficiency  and reduce costs. 
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(2)Establishing a more efficient board. The board of directors of SOEEs should play two major ro les: 
supervisor and consulter. It monitors the behaviour of senior management to maximize the overall 
interests of stakeholders  as well as supports and assists them to improve the efficiency and effectiveness 
of corporate governance, etc. And an efficient board could be established through the enhancing of 
constitution, knowledge, motivation and evaluation. (a)The board  of directors of SOEEs should be 
composed of representatives of various stakeholders. In addition to repres entatives of national investors 
and business executives, it  should be composed of representatives of public interest. For example, 
environmental protection departments should have the right to send representatives to the board because 
environmental p rotection agencies are able to give reasonable suggestions and make more qualified 
monitor when the project involves serious negative externalities. Workers selected by the workers 
congress should also play a role in  the board. And more than half of the seats should be allotted to the 
independent directors. (b)Board  members are required  to master various but complementary expert ises to 
meet  the strategic needs faced by SOEEs while standardized board  member selection procedure is 
expected eagerly. Except those candidates with polit ical background or those with management 
experience in the energy subsidiary, young candidates with rich management experience in the non-
political, non-energy sectors also should be potential directors . (c) Board members should be motivated to 
ensure that interests of directors are in harmony with interests of SOEEs. (d) To improve the work 
efficiency of the board, SASAC should evaluate the performance of the board of SOEES and SASAC 
could turn to the self-evaluation taken by the board in New Zealand for help (the chairman of the board 
evaluates the performance of other directors while other directors evaluate that of the chairman). 
(3) Implementing a reasonable incentive system for operators. The implementation of a reasonable 
incentive system aims to ensure that interests of operator should be consistent with overall interests of 
stakeholders, to stimulate the desire  of operators to succeed while a  large average income gap between 
executives and employees  is held at the bay, to reduce negative externalit ies. Often the incentive system 
for SOEEs’ operators is comprised of monetary incentive and non-monetary one, both of which come into 
effect when the standard performance evaluation system is adopted. In turn the former consist of salary, 
modest job consumption and welfare while the latter is subdivided into job promotion, stock options and 
honours. In addition, performance assessment of operators should pay attention to all relevant factors  of 
the general welfare, such as environmental protection and technological development.  
(4) Revising the supervision and constraint mechanisms. Due to the high risks of opportunism, to be 
put forward are the multip le supervision and constraint mechanisms which fall into the horizontal and 
vertical types. (a)The horizontal supervision and constraint mechanis m touches upon three factors . Firstly, 
the regulatory role of independent directors  should be played fully. Secondly, the independent regulatory 
ability of board of supervisors  is to be enhanced. Independent supervisors are must to obtain the internal 
checks and balances. SASAC should endow employees with more power as supervisors because as 
company’s staff they are well-informed and more observant of the firm and are helpfu l to the board of 
supervisors in taking and making timely preventive measures or punitive decisions. Thirdly, discipline 
inspection and supervision, financial audit supervision, democrat ic supervision of workers in SOEEs are 
required to play their role of ensuring the standardized operation of enterprises . (b) The vert ical 
supervision and constraint mechanis ms are also indispensible for SOEEs. It also involves three aspects: 
the supervision of SASAC over enterprise groups, enterprise groups’ supervision over listed companies 
and other companies, and the self-regulation of listed companies and other companies. While the 
supervision from the SASAC concentrates main ly on asset, such as to ensure the safety of and the 
appreciation of the state-owned asset as well as to restructure and dispose and to prevent the loss of state 
assets, the supervision from enterprise groups mainly refers to financial supervision and regulation, 
watching over operation asset operation and reviewing financial statements. 
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5. Concluding Remarks 
SOEEs bear the heavy responsibility for guaranteeing the energy safety and supporting the economic 
development. However, they are prone to cause many negative externalities during their p roduction 
process, so the governance of SOEES is crucial. SOEEs, in essence, are a kind of contractual arrangement. 
However, Chinese SOEEs are characterized  by monopoly, strong asset specificity, many negative 
externalities and high opportunism risks  which could give rise to some negative consequences such as 
resources waste, market failure. 
To avoid these serious consequences, we believe that special governance mechanism which falls into 
the following four parts  should be adopted to manage SOEEs. (1) Government regulat ion system which 
involves both regulators and content is supposed to be improved. (2)A more efficient board is a must 
which could be improved through constitution, knowledge, mot ivation, evaluation. (3) It is high time to 
establish a reasonable incentive system for operator. And all relevant factors of the general welfare such 
as environmental p rotection and technological advance should also reference for the performance 
assessment of SOEES. (4)The lateral and vert ical supervision and restraint mechanis ms are expected 
eagerly for a long time . We hope through these efforts we could improve the management efficiency of 
SOEEs, promote market-oriented reform of the energy industry and realize the harmonious development 
between man and nature. We also hope that other scholars can make more and better proposals.  
Acknowledgements 
 This paper is sponsored by the Natural Science Foundation of China (No. 70871052) and Humanities 
& Social Science Foundation of Chinese Ministry of Education (No.05JA790031). 
References 
[1] Coase, R H. The Nature of the Firm[J]. Economica. 1937, 4(16): 386-405 
[2] Spulber, D. The theory of the firm [M].New York: Cambridge University Press,2009:1-3 
[3] Alchian, A. Specificity, Specialization, and Coalitions[J]. Zeitschrift fur die gesamte Staatswissenschaft (ZgS),1984,140:50-
53 
[4] Jensen, M., and Meckling, W. Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, Agency Costs, and Ownership Structure[J]. 
Journal of Financial Economics,1976,3(4):305-360 
[5] Liu Shijin. The Nature of Chinese State-Owned Enterprises And Reform Logic[J]. Economic Research Journal,1995,4:29-
36(in Chinese) 
[6] Zhang Yuyan and He Fan. The nature of state-owned enterprises[J].Management World,1996, 6:128-144(in Chinese) 
[7] Huang Sujian,Yu Jing. The Nature, Objectives and Social Responsibility of State- owned Enterprises [J]. China Industrial 
Economy,2006,2:68-76(in Chinese) 
[8] Lin Boqiang. Advanced energy economics [M]. Beijing: China Financial and Economic Publishing House,2009:140(in 
Chinese) 
[9]Williamson, O.E. The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Consideration[J]. American Economic 
Review,1971,61(2):112-123 
[10] Williamson, O.E. The Mechanisms of Governance[M].New York: Oxford University Press,1999:6-10,51-52 
[11] Wang Dan. The development path of China petroleum industry: Oligopolistic competition and regulation[M].Beijing: 
China Social Sciences Press,2007:168-170(in Chinese)  
                                                                 
i
 Williamson, O.E. The Mechanisms of Governance[M].New York: Oxford University Press,1999:51-52 
ii
 Williamson, O.E. The Mechanisms of Governance[M]. New York: Oxford University Press,1999:6 
